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The Normalization of Deviant Organizational Practices:
The Growth of Wage Arrears in Russia, 1992-1999

Abstract

We apply a normalization of deviance model to understand the prevalence of the illegal
practice of wage arrears, the delayed payment of wages, in Russia during the 1990s. The
normalization literature proposes that organizational deviance may be self-reinforcing, such that
initial acts of organizational deviance are likely to induce additional deviations from formal
standards of appropriate behavior. Based on this perspective, we hypothesize that the frequent
adoption of a deviant practice within a community will make it more likely that firms in that
community will engage in deviance and less likely that injured stakeholders will actively
mobilize to oppose it. Our empirical analysis of wage arrears in Russia, based on data from a
large, nationally representative sample of Russian agricultural and industrial enterprises, supports
our hypotheses. Our findings show robust community effects both in firm use of wage arrears,
controlling for firm performance and liquidity, and in workers‟ mobilization against them,
through their quit (exit) and strike (voice) behavior.
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Quid leges sine moribus vanae proficient
(Of what use are laws empty of customs?)
– Odes of Horace, 3.24

A growing stream of research in the management literature has examined deviant
organizational behavior as a property of the institutional context in which it takes place. By a
deviant organizational behavior, we refer to “an event, activity or circumstance, occurring in
and/or produced by a formal organization, that deviates from both formal design goals and
normative standards or expectations, either in the fact of its occurrence or in its consequences”
(Vaughan, 1999: 273). Organizational deviance is sometimes explained by the breakdown of a
normally well-functioning institutional system, such that organizational mistakes, misconduct
and disasters are seen as rare events limited to marginal and failing organizations. In contrast, an
institutional perspective views organizational deviance as “a routine by-product of the
characteristics of the system itself” (Vaughan, 1999: 274). Once a community normalizes a
deviant organizational practice, it is no longer viewed as an aberrant act that elicits an
exceptional response; instead, it becomes a routine activity that is commonly anticipated and
frequently used (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 2001; Ermann &
Lundman, 2002; Palmer, 2008; Pinto, Leana & Pil, 2008).
While organizational research has usually analyzed normalization processes at the level
of the individual firm, Misangyi et al. (2008) call for the extension of this perspective to the
study of organizational deviance at higher levels of analysis. They note that recent scandals in
the United States have been “industry wide (e.g. accounting, energy, insurance, mutual funds) or
regional (e.g. California‟s energy crisis), and not merely a matter of misbehavior by a specific
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organization, group or individual” (Misangyi et al., 2008: 750). To extend analysis of the
institutional context of deviant organizational behavior, they propose that “amoral (and corrupt)
reasoning, and the responses to it, need to be construed as part of a larger institutional logic
within which individuals, organizations, and even researchers are embedded.”
In this paper, we address this call to extend the normalization model to higher levels of
analysis. Research into organizational misconduct has demonstrated that deviant behavior may
not only grow within an organization, but also may spread between organizations that work
closely with each other (Vaughan, 1996; Zey, 1993, 1998) and between organizations that
operate in the same industry (Geis, 1977; Baucus and Near, 1991; Simpson, 1986). A
normalization perspective suggests that institutional processes may also influence the persistence
of deviant organizational behavior among organizations that have no direct economic ties and
that operate in different industries. If deviant behavior is allowed to persist unchecked over a
long period of time within a local community, then deviance may become routinely used and
anticipated among the organizations that work in that community despite contradicting the
formal rules of society.
To develop hypotheses about the impact of normalization processes on the persistence of
community norms of deviant behavior, we build upon related research that has studied the role of
institutional context in facilitating the spread of organizational practices within a common field
of actors (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Fligstein, 1985). While this
research has usually focused on legitimate organizational practices – practices that conform to
the broader regulatory and normative standards of broader society – we suggest a similar
institutional perspective can be applied to the study of deviant organizational practices. A
common finding in the organization literature is that the cumulative use of an organizational
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practice within a field is likely to positively influence the subsequent growth and survival of the
practice (Guler, Guillen, and Macpherson, 2002; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993; Westphal,
Gulati, and Shortell, 1997). Based on a similar logic, we hypothesize that, all else being equal,
managers operating in communities with a higher prevalence of deviance will be more likely to
engage in deviant behavior than will managers operating in communities with a lower
prevalence.
While we first examine the implications of normalization processes from the point of
managers who engage in deviant behavior, we also propose that normalization is likely to
contribute to the persistence of deviant organizational behavior through its impact on other
stakeholders as well. In particular, we examine the case of labor-related deviance where workers
suffer harm from an organizational practice that violates the formal rules of society. We
hypothesize that there will be less worker strikes and quits in communities with higher rates of
deviant behavior, despite the fact that the hardships suffered from organizational deviance will
be felt the strongest in these communities. By including an analysis of stakeholder responses in
our study, we respond to the call of multiple organizational scholars for more research to include
audiences and interests beyond those of managers when examining the ways that institutional
processes shape organizational behavior (Clemens and Cook, 1999; Hinings and Greenwood,
2002; Seo and Creed, 2002; Stryker, 2000).
We test our hypotheses through an analysis of managerial and worker responses to the
growth of wage arrears in Russia in the late 1990s. Wage arrears, the late and non-payment of
contractual wages to employees, first became substantial in Russia in 1993, and the aggregate
stock of overdue wages grew to a total of 50 trillion rubles (around 8 billion dollars U.S.) by the
beginning of 1998 (Goskomstat, 1998). Nearly two-thirds of Russian employees reported they

4

were owed overdue wages by the end of that year, with an average debt of 4.8 monthly wages per
affected worker (Earle and Sabirianova, 2000). The growth of wage arrears took place despite the
fact that they were illegal and frequently normatively condemned. Indeed, while the legal
systems of most other countries provide no special provisions for wage arrears, treating them
merely as a particular case of contract violations, the Russian Labor Code explicitly outlawed
them. Moreover, public opinion data research has demonstrated that Russian workers consistently
placed the problem of wage arrears as one of the fundamental problems facing the country
(Javeline, 2003). Gerber (2006) finds that Russian workers that received wage arrears were more
likely to have health problems and a lower standard of living than those that received contractual
wages.
Our analysis of a large survey of Russian agricultural and industrial firms, containing
annual information from 1991 to 1998, provides strong support for our normalization hypotheses
in the context of wage arrears in Russia. Despite being illegal and frequently normatively
condemned, wage arrears were nonetheless routinely used with little worker opposition in many
Russian communities.

THE NORMALIZATION OF DEVIANT ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES
The normalization literature distinguishes between factors that lead to the genesis of
organizational deviance and factors that cause deviance to become routine, rather than
idiosyncratic, behavior. A permissive ethical climate, an emphasis on financial goals at all costs,
and an opportunity to act amorally or immorally, all contribute to managerial decisions to initiate
deviance (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 2001). If deviance is allowed
to continue unchecked, then individual acts of deviance can turn over time into “institutionalized
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corruption: personal behaviors become impersonal norms, emergent practices become tacit
understandings and idiosyncratic acts become shared procedures” (Ashford and Anand, 2003: 9).
Behavior that some societal groups may label as corrupt, illegal or immoral can become routinely
used, widely anticipated and institutionally rewarded.
Ashford and Anand (2003) posit three stages of normalization: institutionalization,
rationalization and socialization. Institutionalization refers to the process by which initial deviant
decisions or acts become embedded in organizational structures and processes; rationalization to
the process by which new ideologies develop to justify and perhaps even valorize corruption; and
socialization refers to the process by which newcomers come to accept deviance as permissible if
not desirable. While separating these stages of normalization for analytic purposes, Ashford and
Anand (2003: 35) suggest that each process “reinforces and in turn is reinforced by the other
two.” For instance, institutionalization processes lead to the construction of informal procedures
and norms that reward deviant behavior, which reinforces efforts to rationalize local standards of
behavior and socialize newcomers. Individuals are less likely to openly question or challenge the
status quo as the costs of opposition, and the benefits to conformity, rise over time.
Ermann and Lundman (2002) develop a similar process model as Ashford and Anand
(2003) to examine organizational deviance, but add an additional stage of “stakeholder reactions”
to their analysis. They write that “institutionalized deviance typically continues until stopped
from inside or outside the organization. Internally, whistle blowers may step forward with
accusations and evidence of wrongdoing. Externally, the media, prosecutors, or victims may
challenge organizational actions.” (Ermann and Lundman, 2002: 27). Their identification of
external challengers to organizational deviance, such as the media and prosecutors, is similar to
Palmer‟s (2008) argument that the actions of “social control agents” need to be included in the
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study of organizational wrong-doing. If community leaders and regulators do not forcibly
respond to organizational deviance, then organizational members are likely to conclude that there
are few regulatory consequences or normative improprieties in violating formal standards of
behavior (see also Brief et. al, 2001).
As well as looking at external challenges to deviance, the normalization literature also
closely examines the potential of internal challengers. For instance, in their analysis of whistleblowers, Ashford and Anand (2003: 37-39) note that normalization processes make it increasingly
difficult for internal challenges to deviant behavior to succeed. As deviance increases in scale and
scope, organizational members who may personally condemn such behavior may nonetheless
consider themselves powerless to oppose it. Ashforth and Anand (2003: 37) write that whistleblowing is so “fraught with career-threatening outcomes, that when three individuals did it in one
year, they were named Time Magazine‟s Persons of the Year in 2002.”
The case of worker movements that oppose labor-related organizational deviance provides
another illustration of the role that internal stakeholders may play in reversing the normalization
process. A long literature has demonstrated that organizations frequently implement policies that
curtail human rights, offer below minimum wages, or provide inadequate health and safety
working conditions (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Rosen, 2002). In some communities,
sweatshops are accepted as a routine and everyday part of economic life despite their violations of
the formal rules of society (Radin and Calkins, 2006). However, research into worker movements
illustrates workers are not always passive recipients of managerial choices, but at times mobilize
to transform the institutional environment in which they work (Pivens and Cloward, 1977). For
instance, Edwards (1979) demonstrates that the question of who defined the limits to managerial
discretion became highly contested in the United States, often leading to violent interaction
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between workers and managers. Similarly, comparative management researchers have
demonstrated that political conflict and settlements between workers and managers has been an
important factor in explaining cross-national variation in corporate governance systems (Aguilera
and Jackson, 2003; Roe, 2006).
The fact that multiple audiences, either external or internal to the firm, often oppose
organizational deviance helps to explain why normalization is so rare in many communities.
Social control agents, whistle-blowers and workers have all been shown to successfully challenge
or reverse normalization processes. Given the possibility that multiple social actors may oppose
deviant organizational behavior, managers and other stakeholders are likely to view initial acts of
deviance with uncertainty over their effectiveness and permanence. As a new deviant behavior is
first introduced, the degree and extent of external and internal opposition is likely to be an
important question for managers evaluating the new practice (Pinto et al., 2008). However, if
deviance proceeds unchecked over a period of time, then managers are likely to become
increasingly assured of the effectiveness of such practices. At the same time, challengers to
deviant behavior are likely to become increasingly convinced of its permanence as it becomes
more frequently use. Those who might have the most desire to oppose deviance may nonetheless
define their immediate interests as accommodating to existing patterns of behavior rather than
engaging in social mobilization efforts designed to challenge them (Misogyni et al., 2008; Seo
and Creed, 2002).
In the section below, we analyze separately the proposed effects of normalization on
managers‟ decisions to engage in deviant behavior and on others‟ decision to oppose it. As
normalization processes widen the scope of managerial options to pursue profits through new
forms of deviant behavior, we also propose that they limit the options open to others to challenge
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that behavior.

The Use of Deviant Organizational Practices
An important implication of the normalization model is that the initial use of a deviant
organizational practice is likely to contribute to its own reproduction through its effect on
managerial cognition and reasoning. Pinto et al. (2008) discuss the role of sensemaking and
routinization in explaining the cognitive mechanisms that lead to the normalization of corruption
within an organization. Sensemaking occurs when members confront events, issues, and actions
that are somehow surprising or confusing (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Louis, 1980). When
managers first encounter deviant behavior, for instance, the need to make sense of the new
practice is likely to lead them to carefully observe the actions of others to uncover the operating
norms of behavior within the organization and the broader society. As initial uncertainty fades
and a practice becomes routinized, however, this active consideration of external norms and
internal morality is likely to decrease. With continued use, deviance may become a normal and
everyday practice that managers use with little active thought.
Pinto et al. (2008) build from Tenbrunsel and Messick‟s (2004) work on the “slippery
slope” of ethical decision-making to identify why the ethical aspects of managerial decisionmaking may come to fade into the background through routinization. Psychological numbing
takes place as members of a community become repeatedly exposed to deviant behavior; over
time, “repeated exposures to ethical dilemmas may produce a form of ethical numbing in which
self-reproof is diminished” (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 2004: 228). A process of induction also
contributes to the incremental entrenchment of deviant behavior over time. Using inductive
logic, managers are likely to rely on past organizational decisions as a guide to evaluate the
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ethicality of new forms of behavior. The past success of deviant practices is assumed to validate
the process through which initial deviant decisions were made (see also Ashford and Anand,
2003: 9). The frequent use of a deviant practice therefore provides an ethical precedent that
encourages its future use without a continuous reexamination of its acceptability: “Routinization
means that when a practice has become routine, it is ordinary, mundane, and acceptable. Any
ethical coloration is lost.” (Tenbrunel and Messick, 2004: 228).
The discussion of the amplifying effects of deviance through its routine use relates to
similar arguments made about the spread of legitimate organizational practices across
organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 1985; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). In the
literature on organizational fields in the management literature, normative standards of behavior
are not simply imposed on managers by more powerful organizations such as the state or
professional organizations. Instead, managers themselves are participants in the construction of
the commonly accepted standards of behavior under which they operate. A process of social
learning and observation moves an organizational practice from an innovation that requires
active efforts of sensemaking to a routine behavior that operates as a habitual response to
common organizational problems. The more that a practice becomes frequently performed
within a field, then the more likely that other managers in the field will come to adopt the
practice over time. A firm‟s adoption of a new activity therefore has consequences not only for
the firm itself, but also for the community as a whole.
Organizational researchers have frequently used a measure of a practice‟s cumulative
adoption within an organizational field to study institutional effects in the spread of a new
organizational practice (Burns and Wholey, 1993; Davis, 1991; Guler, Guillen, and Macpherson,
2002; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993; Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell, 1997). These authors
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argue that the wide-spread use of an organizational practice communicates to members of a
social system the operable norms of appropriate behavior in ways that an examination of formal
law or expressed moral sentiment cannot. We suggest that a similar logic can be applied to the
study of deviant organizational practices. The wide-spread use of a practice may communicate
that an organizational practice has lost any special regulatory or moral status within a
community, i.e. it is normalized, as much as it may communicate that a practice has come to take
on new positive, social meanings, i.e. it is legitimized. We propose that the cumulative and
successful use of a deviant organizational practice is likely to reinforce perceptions of its
normalization among managers who work within the same community, which, in turn, will
contribute to its continued use. This leads to our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Independent of firm performance, firms operating in communities with a
higher prevalence of deviance will be more likely to engage in deviant behavior than will
firms operating in communities with a lower prevalence.

Reactions to Deviant Organizational Practices
An important question in the persistence of deviant organizational practices is not only
why managers choose to use them, but also why other stakeholders permit managers to shape the
workplace as they choose (Ermann and Lundman, 2002). The influence of institutionalization
processes on the degree of opposition to a new practice is often theorized in the organizational
literature. Jepperson (1991: 145) suggests that institutionalized practices “owe their survival to
relatively self-activating social processes. Their persistence is not dependent notably, upon
recurrent collective mobilization....” Tolbert and Zucker (1996) similarly suggest that “relatively
low resistance by opposing groups” is an important indicator of the degree of institutionalization
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of an organizational practice. We make a related argument about normalization processes. We
suggest that the more a deviant behavior becomes normalized, then the lower the resistance by
opposing groups.
Misangyi. et al. (2008) identify multiple mechanisms by which normalization processes
are likely to decrease stakeholder opposition to deviant behavior. In their analysis of the
strategies that lead to successful anti-corruption campaigns, Misangyi et al. (2008: 756) first note
that “conditions that trigger deliberative cognition about behavior makes institutional change
more likely, as such deliberation renders often taken-for-granted institutional logics visible and
thus open to question or challenge (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Seo
and Creed, 2002).” A critical task in anti-corruption campaigns is therefore to challenge the
routine acceptance of deviant behavior such that alternative institutional arrangements seem
possible and obtainable. A similar logic can also be made about why uncontested normalization
processes are likely to lead to decreasing amounts of opposition. As a deviant practice becomes
increasingly accepted as a routine part of everyday life, then active deliberation and conversation
about its appropriateness is likely to diminish. From this perspective, the routinization and
rationalization processes that were identified as accelerating the managerial use of a deviant
practices are also likely to decrease stakeholder challenges to the practice.
Misangyi et. al. (2008) further posit that normalization processes entrench deviant
behavior within a community through the redistribution of resources in favor of the status quo,
an argument similar to Ashford and Anand‟s (2003) position that normalization processes
reshape organizational incentive systems to reward deviance and punish opposition. As a
deviant practice spreads in its use across a community, those who benefit from this activity
gather additional resources to reward those who conform to local norms and to punish those who
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oppose them. This redistribution of resources leads to growing differences in financial wealth
between members of a community as well as differences in human capital (e.g. access to
education and expertise) and social capital (e.g. access to individuals who regulate markets and
society). The power of those that support deviance systems comes not only from their direct
access to cash, but also through their ability to shape institutional rules and rewards in their own
favor (Clemens and Cook, 1999; Seo and Creed, 2002). Given the differentials in resources
between those who support and oppose institutionalized deviance, Misangyi et al. (2008) suggest
that anti-corruption campaigns most not only motivate those who oppose deviance by facilitating
active discussion of alternative futures but also by providing resources to allow these actors to
effectively act on their beliefs.
Misangyi et al.‟s (2008) proposal that the cognitive and resource effects of normalization
processes act in tandem to support deviant behavior within communities is similar to Ashford
and Anand‟s (2003: 38) argument that deviance is “normalized when the group‟s structure,
processes and employee mental models act together to perpetuate unethical acts.” The
normalization literature does not isolate a single mechanism in explaining normalization effects,
but instead notes the overlapping and self-reinforcing mechanisms of several processes taking
place at the same time. Misangyi et al. (2008) build on this tradition when identifying the
multiple processes that make it difficult for challengers to successfully mobilize against
corruption in communities with high levels of normalized deviance.
Workers mobilization against violations of formal labor standards and rights
provide an important example of the tight interconnection between symbol and substance
in the persistence of deviant organizational behavior. Pivens and Cloward (1978) remark
that “the social arrangements that are perceived as just and immutable must come to seem
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both unjust and mutable” before workers mobilize to oppose managerial action. From this
perspective, the normalization of a deviant organizational practice within a community
may lead workers to change what they consider to be “just” organizational behavior, as
routinization and rationalization processes alter the normative standards used to evaluate
managerial behavior. Just as importantly, the continued use of a practice within a
community may also transform beliefs about the relative permanence of a practice, i.e.,
what is “mutable.” The frequent use of a deviant organizational practice within a
community is likely to reinforce the belief among injured stakeholders that they are
powerless under existing institutional conditions to contest what they consider to be
deviant organizational behavior.
Organizational researchers have often noted that strategic actors respond to
institutional norms in the broader environment not only because they value or agree with
them, but also because they become “experienced as possessing a reality of their own, a
reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact” (Berger and
Luckman, 1966: 58, cited in Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). The belief in the “exteriority” of
social practices as beyond the ability to change leads strategic actors to accept social norms
as a stable component of the way the world is, even if that practice does not match a
normative perception of the way the world should be (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991;
Zucker, 1977). While much of organizational theory has applied this argument to
managerial actions, we propose that another fruitful application is to the study of
stakeholder opposition to deviant organizational practices.
We develop two hypotheses specifically about the potential reaction of workers to
deviant organizational behaviors that have strong adverse effects on employee welfare.
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Hirschman (1970) identifies two primary mechanisms by which workers are able to
challenge organizational activity: exit and voice. Based on the argument that
normalization decreases manifest opposition to a deviant organizational practice, we first
hypothesize that the more that organizations within a community use a deviant
organizational practice that negatively impacts worker welfare, the less likely that workers
in that community will exit (quit) a firm that uses the practice. We then hypothesize that
the greater use within a community of such a deviant organizational practice, then the
lower the probability that workers in that community will express voice (strike) against a
firm that uses the practice. Our two hypotheses are as followed:

Hypothesis 2: The prevalence of a deviant organizational practice within a community
will moderate the relationship between firm-level deviant behavior and employee
turnover, such that the greater prevalence of a deviant behavior within a community, the
less likely that employees will quit firms that engage in that deviant behavior.

Hypothesis 3: The prevalence of a deviant organizational practice within a community
will moderate the relationship between firm-level deviant behavior and employee strikes,
such that the greater prevalence of a deviant behavior within a community, the less
likely that employees will strike against firms that engage in that deviant behavior.

WAGE ARREARS IN RUSSIA
Background
Taking their starting point in the neoclassical economic model of wage adjustment, most
prior studies of the Russian labor market have treated wage arrears as a “flexible” way for firms
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to reduce labor costs (Alfandari and Schaffer, 1996; Desai and Idson, 2000; Gimpelson, 1998;
Layard and Richter, 1994; Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquisti, 1999; a critique of this approach
can be found in Earle and Sabirianova, 2000 and 2002). The pressure to cut labor costs in Russia
had been heavy due to the inherited situation of overstaffing, particularly in industrial enterprises,
which, emerging from the constraints and supports of administrative planning, had experienced
tremendous shocks to their product and factor markets. GDP had fallen by about 40 percent, and
industrial production had been cut by over half in the early and mid-1990s (Goskomstat, 1998).
Faced with this crisis, firms responded by reducing employment, hours of work, real wage rates,
and employee benefits as well as delaying wages. A firm-level consequence of wage arrears – the
ability to adjust wages flexibly under conditions of high uncertainty and difficult economic
conditions – is portrayed as the primary causal explanation of why this practice has diffused so
widely in post-communist Russia.
The application of a neo-classical economic model to the study of wage arrears assumes
that markets function in a similar manner across societies: economic models developed in the
United States can be applied with little adaptation abroad. In contrast, a normalization of
deviance model suggests that organizational behavior may differ strongly across communities:
practices that are routinely used in one society may be normatively sanctioned and opposed in
another. A comparison of the widespread use of wage arrears in Russia with the practice of ontime payment in other countries illustrates the difference between a normalization of deviance
perspective and the neo-classical argument. As Gerber (2006) notes, wage arrears are not only
much rarer in most economies (including most post-socialist countries), but also when they do
appear, the circumstances tend to be quite special. For instance, they may appear in small start-up
companies facing severe liquidity constraints, bankrupt firms about to be shut down, or occasional
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situations of fraud. For most firms under most circumstances, the choice of delaying wage
payments is simply not an option. In the rare cases when arrears do occur, most communities
react to this form of behavior as an abdication of contractual obligations instead of accepting it as
an acceptable firm strategy to facilitate wage adjustment. Social understandings, not economic
ones, provide the boundaries of what is considered to be legitimate behavior.
The issue in the spread of wage arrears is not only, or even primarily, one of legality.
Indeed, while the legal systems of most other countries provide no special provisions for wage
arrears, the Russian Labor Code explicitly outlaws the use of the practice. Firms may be called to
account either by the civil courts (when workers file a lawsuit) or the Ministry of Labor‟s
Inspection Service, in the latter case sometimes leading to criminal court procedures.
The prevalence of this practice, despite its illegality, illustrates the distinction between
formal law and informal norms of appropriate behavior. Law has meaning only if it enters into the
actions of individuals. The importance of social meaning in explaining the norm of on-time
payment in many countries is not simply that late-payment is illegal, but that, in most situations,
on-time payment is taken for granted. Western managers do not explicitly strategize about the
costs and benefits of avoiding wage obligations, as if this practice represented a legitimate option
among a menu of strategic choices. Instead, there is a cognitive component of institutionalized
action in which practices are routinely chosen – or ignored – based on taken-for-granted norms of
behavior (March and Olsen, 1989). What is taken-for-granted in one society may be very different
from what is taken-for-granted in another.
While a comparison of wage arrears in Russia with norms of on-time payment in other
countries provides important insights into the role of institutional context in explaining crossnational differences in organizational behavior, we focus in our analysis on variation in the use of
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wage arrears between communities within Russia. By looking at comparisons within Russia, we
are able to control for explanations of wage arrears that stress national characteristics, such as the
idiosyncrasies of Russian culture or the weakness of the Russian state, in explaining this
phenomenon. We are also able to control for measures of firm performance that the neo-classical
model identifies as primary causes of wage arrears, such as a firm‟s problems with product
demand and liquidity, while, at the same time, still vary the community context in which the
organization is located. We examine variation in the prevalence of wage arrears across Russian
communities in testing our hypotheses of the impact of normalization processes in influencing
managerial decisions to use deviant practices and workers‟ decisions to oppose them.

Data
The firm-level data in this paper were collected to provide precise measures of wage
arrears, growth, liquidity, labor, strikes, and turnover at the firm level for the period from 1991 to
1998.1 The data were collected in 1999 and 2000 as part of a larger study of Russian firms. The
data from the responses to this questionnaire were also linked to other data sources (Goskomstat
industrial and agricultural registries and balance sheets) to supplement and further check the
provided information. If particular data could not be reconstructed through past recording
records, interviewers then asked managers to answer a survey of the frequency of events or
practices for each year. We describe below our sample, research design, and specific
operationalizations of the variables of interest.

1

The survey of industrial firms also contained questions on 1999, but because firms interviewed in 1999 could provide information only through 1998 the sample for 1999 is much smaller (half the size of the 1998 sample), and it is
nonrandom. So we exclude 1999 from the analysis. Results including 1999 are however quite similar to those we
present.
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Sample
The sample of firms is based on all industrial and agricultural employers of the employeerespondents to a nationwide household survey, the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
(RLMS).2 The sampling for the RLMS involved regional stratification across 50 raions within 32
Russian oblasts, with the probability of selection proportional to population (except for the cities
of Moscow and St. Petersburg, which were taken as self-representing). Russian raions are roughly
equivalent to the concept of a “county” in the United States; they represent a meaningful
administrative unit below that of the oblast (regional) government. Household addresses were
randomly selected for interviewing within the geographical sampling units. Thus, conditional on
the same community stratification procedure, the firms in our sample constitute a national
probability sample of industrial employers, with selection probability proportional to employment
size.3
Unlike most surveys of firms, our procedure did not replace nonresponding firms with
other observations, and interviewers expended great efforts to include every firm on their sample
lists. As a result of this procedure, the response rate was approximately 64% among industrial
firms (522 firms) and 73% among agricultural firms (75 firms). The regional and sectoral shares
match those in the official statistics reasonably well, as shown in Biletsky et al. (2003).
Response rates did not differ between the large firms in the government registries of enterprises

2

The sampling strategy is very similar to the NOS (National Organizations Study) in U.S., which relies on employers of respondents in the GSS (General Social Survey). See Marsden, Kalleberg, and Knoke (2000) for a description
of sampling in the NOS.
3
To be precise, the RLMS involves a two-stage geographic stratification procedure followed by random drawing of
households (residences); thus the probability for any household i to appear in the sample Si is Pr(i Si) = Pr(i
U1)*Pr(i U2|U2U1)*s/n2, where U1 is the set of primary sampling units, U2 is the set of secondary sampling units,
s is the sample size, and n2 is the total number of households in U2. The probability that employer j is included in
our firm sample Sj is then simply the joint probability equal to Pr(iSi)*Pr(i contains an employee of j), if the
distribution of employment across households is independent of the conditional probability of selecting i. The
property of independence holds in the RLMS, since the final drawing is random and therefore equal for all n2
households. See Swafford (1997) for more information on the RLMS sampling procedure.
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and smaller firms that do not appear in the registry, so there is no evidence of size-related bias.
In total, the sample of firms, conditioned on a non-missing wage arrears variable (since
this is necessary at each step in the analysis), is 560 firms, of which 486 come from the industrial
firm survey and 74 from the agricultural firm survey. Firms interviewed before early 2000 did
not provide information on 1999, as their accounts were not yet ready. The agricultural firm
survey also includes information only through 1998.

Variables
Firm Wage Arrears. An organizational practice can be measured either as an indicator
(dummy) variable for whether an organization engages in the practice at all or as a continuous
measure of the extent to which the organization uses the practice. We employ both measures in
this paper. The standard measure of the amount of wage arrears in Russia – whether in
individual-firm balance sheets, in official Russian statistics or the minds of workers – is the stock
of wages that is overdue (Earle and Sabirianova, 2002). The usual way managers express this
stock is in terms of monthly wage bills (payrolls or total wage costs for the month). Thus, in our
own interviews with managers, conducted when we were designing the data collection
instrument, a common type of answer to a question about arrears would be “We‟re doing well, so
we only owe one month,” or “Things have gotten worse and now we have five months of
arrears.”
Our data contain this measure of the firm-level stock of wage arrears in monthly wage
bills, as reported by a top manager in each year from 1991 to 1998. We label this variable
Arrears (months). Using this information, we also construct a dummy variable for whether the
firm had any wage arrears in a particular year, labeled Arrears (dummy). The data also contain
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wage arrears on the balance sheet, which we use to construct an alternative dummy variable. 4
Local Arrears. Measuring the community norm requires an assumption about the
relevant organizational field or geographic unit defining the community. We use the unit of
analysis defined as the raion (county) as the boundaries of the communities around which we
develop our hypotheses. Russian raions are distinct administrative units, and studies have shown
that the labor market tends to be highly local in Russia, as geographic mobility is difficult (see,
e.g., Mitchneck and Plane, 1995). Our data contain firms from 50 raions of Russia.
Analogously to the measure of a practice at the organizational level, the community norm
may be defined in terms of the frequency or intensity of the use of the practice. We use both,
and our two measures of the community wage arrears norm correspond to the two measures of
arrears at the organizational level: Local Arrears (months) represents the average stock of wage
arrears among the sampled agricultural and industrial firms, and Local Arrears (share), measures
the share (proportion) of organizations using wage arrears. In both cases, the variable refers to
the firm‟s raion in the previous year.
Worker Quits (Q) and Strikes (S). Quit rates (Q) for each year were calculated by
dividing total voluntary separations by average employment for the corresponding year. These
data were obtained from annual employment reports to the Goskomstat (the “P-4 form” in recent
years), and again the precise line numbers were specified in our data collection instrument. The
incidence of strikes (a dummy variable, S) was measured through survey questions to top
managers on whether work protests had occurred at the firm, including not only conventional
work stoppages but also in a few cases hunger strikes, demonstrations, slowdowns, and other
actions. The survey also asked for the main motivation for the protest, and it is interesting to

4

The results are very similar to those we received from the managerial reports, so we do not report them in the paper, but they are available on request.
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note that more than 90 percent of the responses reported wage arrears as the cause; this variable
is therefore very appropriate for our purposes.

Control Variables
We collected multiple measures of both firm growth and liquidity to control for
differences in firm performance as an antecedent of an organization‟s use of wage arrears. One
set of growth measures relates to performance of the firm in general: output growth, sales
growth, and profitability. The second set of measures relates more directly to labor market
behavior: growth in employment, real wages, nominal wages, and the hiring rate. Other growth
proxies include the hiring rate and whether the firm received patents on any innovations. All
these variables are represented with the notation G. Liquidity measures (L) include profitability
(which could also be viewed as a performance measure), frozen bank account in response to
nonpayment of debts (kartoteka), barter in payments for inputs and outputs, and overdue
receivables and payables. Changes in these variables are calculated for each year in which the
data were collected.
We also include industry indicators to proxy both for demand conditions and for
differences in technology that may increase the propensity of firms to use wage arrears and of
workers to strike and quit (for instance, due to differences in skill specificity). We similarly
include a location code for whether a firm is located in a capital city, other city, or a non-city, the
rationale being that workers‟ reactions to late wage payments may be influenced by their outside
options in the local labor market. In general, the larger the urban area, the greater the number of
outside options workers may be expected to have. Unionization is included because unions may
resist arrears, although some observers believe that Russian unions have had little influence on
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labor market outcomes (e.g., Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 2001; Kapeliushnikov, 2001). Fringe
benefits may also affect worker behavior, particularly their tendency to quit (Layard and Richter,
1995) and strike, while the measure of initial training costs captures the firm‟s costs of
adjustment in replacing workers who quit. Because training costs are missing in about 10
percent of the cases, we impute the mean and include a control for nonreporting in some of the
regressions.

Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows the results from analyzing our survey data on the incidence – mean
Arrears (dummy) – and magnitude – Arrears (months) - by year from 1991 to 1998. Consistent
with other sources, the data show a negligible level of arrears in 1992, followed by a rapid
increase. By 1998, about 60 percent of firms reported they had overdue wage debts, with an
average of 4.3 monthly wage bills of overdue debt among affected firms. While there were
relatively few with just a single monthly wage bill of arrears, more than 25 percent reported
arrears exceeding 4 months. Thus, our data correspond well to other information on wage
arrears in Russia (see Earle and Sabirianova, 2002).
***INSERT TABLE 1 HERE***
Table 2 presents the characteristics of the total sample in 1998. Together with the control
variables (industry, hiring rate, etc.), the table also shows our alternative measures of growth
(denoted as G): sales, output, real and nominal wages, and employment. Other growth proxies
include the hiring rate and whether the firm received patents on any innovations. The
magnitudes of these variables are very similar to what can be found in other studies of the
Russian economy and labor markets (OECD, 2000; Kapeliushnikov, 2001). Finally, the table
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also shows the mean and standard deviation of our worker response measures, strikes (S) and
quits (Q). Only about 5.5 percent of organizations experienced a strike in 1998, although again it
is notable that nearly all of them attributed the incident to wage arrears. The annual quit rate, at
19.8 percent, is very similar to other reported figures (e.g., Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 2001;
Kapeliushnikov, 2001).
***INSERT TABLE 2 HERE***
Analysis
The Use of Wage Arrears. To test Hypothesis 1, we estimate the effect of the potential
determinants of arrears in a multivariate panel regression as follows:
Arrearsit = ‘Xit + LocalArrearsit-1 + 1Git + 2Lit + t + uit,
so that Arrearsit = wage arrears of firm i in year t, Xit is the set of controls discussed with
reference to Table 1, Local Arrearsit-1 is the lagged regional level of arrears, Git is a measure of
firm growth, and Lit is a measure of firm liquidity. The t are year dummies, the , , 1, and 2
are parameters to be estimated, and the uit reflect the influence of unobserved factors on wage
arrears. As discussed above, the dependent variable is measured in two alternative ways,
Arrears (months) and Arrears (dummy). In the latter case, the model estimates the impact of a
lagged change in the community norm on the probability of a firm engaging in the practice; it is
a linear probability model (LPM).5 The main variable of interest also has two measures, Local
Arrears (months) and Local Arrears (share).
A first test of the multivariate model maintains the assumption of a zero conditional mean
of the uit, estimating with pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). While we believe this is a useful
starting point, one potential problem with these results could arise if there is some unobservable
5

We have also estimated other functional forms, such as probit and logit, with results for the marginal effects very
similar to the LPM.
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wage arrears effect that is correlated with Local Arrears. Suppose, for example, that firms tend
to cluster regionally, such that firms with a high unobserved “propensity to have arrears” tend to
be found near each other. This propensity will be positively correlated with both Arrears and
Local Arrears, imparting an upward bias to the estimated . A second type of model exploits our
panel data to control for this correlated effect. We decompose the error term uit =i + it, where

i reflects this propensity (and other unobserved fixed factors). We used a firm fixed effect
model to implement this estimation.

Worker Responses to Wage Arrears. To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we estimate the effect of firmlevel arrears and their interaction with average community arrears on worker responses through
voice (incidence of strikes and protests, S) and exit (quit rate, Q). We specify the following
equations:
Qit = 1Arrearsit-1 + 2Local Arrearsit-1 + (12 Arrearsit-1 x Local Arrearsit-1 )+ ‘Xit + 2i + 2t + wit

Sit = 1Arrearsit-1 + 2Local Arrearsit-1 + (12 Arrearsit-1 x Local Arrearsit-1 )+ ‘Xit + 1t + vit,
where the interaction between Arrears and Local Arrears permits worker responses to their own
firm‟s arrears to vary with the local norm, and other variables are defined as before. The critical
parameters in these equations for Hypotheses 2 and 3 are the coefficients 12 and 12. When
Local Arrears are close to zero, then the reactions of quits and strikes to higher firm arrears are
given by 1 and 1, respectively; as Local Arrears increase, the responsiveness of each changes
in the amount 12 and 12 for each unit of Local Arrears. Expressed mathematically,
∂Q/∂Arrears = 1 + 12Local Arrears and ∂S/∂Arrears = 1 + 12Local Arrears. According to
Hypotheses 2 and 3, 12 and 12 are negative: local wage arrears attenuate the effect of a firm‟s
arrears on worker reactions through quits and strikes. Again, we use panel regression to test
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these models against the data.
RESULTS
The Use of Wage Arrears
Table 3 presents the results with Arrears (months) as the dependent variable, based on
pooled OLS and fixed effects estimations. As we show later, results for the variable of interest,
Local Arrears (measured both in months and as a share of local firms), are quite similar across
alternative measures of the growth and liquidity characteristics of firms, and in Table 3, these
factors are proxied by the annual growth rate of sales and nominal wages. In both the pooled
OLS and fixed effects specifications, the lagged Local Arrears is estimated to have a positive
and highly significant impact, one which is only moderately attenuated in FE compared to OLS.
The coefficients imply that an increase in Local Arrears (months) of one monthly wage bill tends
to raise firm Arrears (months) by 40 to 50 percent of a monthly wage bill. An increase in Local
Arrears (share) of 0.5 (the change in Russia from the early to the late 1990s) increases Arrears
(months) by 1.2 to 1.8 monthly wage bills.
***INSERT TABLE 3 HERE***
In the OLS estimates, sales and wage growth are estimated to have negative effects on
Arrears (months), consistent with the neoclassical explanation, but sales growth is statistically
insignificant when firm fixed effects are included. The results for other control variables show
that larger firms tend to have higher Arrears (months) on average, but the negative coefficients in
the FE specification imply that shrinking firms have higher arrears. Organizations with low
levels of unionization tend to have lower arrears, as do firms providing fringe benefits (housing,
kindergartens, and training). More isolated communities (smaller cities and rural areas) tend to
have higher arrears, as do particular industries (machine building and agriculture), again
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consistent with previous research.
Table 4 contains results using the alternative dependent variable capturing any use of the
wage arrears practice: Arrears (dummy). Again, the estimated coefficients on Local Arrears are
positive and highly statistically significant regardless of whether the specification is OLS or FE
and for both the months and share measures. The coefficients on Local Arrears (months) imply
that a one-month increase in the average use of the practice in the community increase the
probability that the firm will use the practice by 6-7 percent in the following year. The
coefficients on Local Arrears (share) imply that a 50 percentage point increase in the proportion
of firms using arrears implies a 24 to 38 percent increase in the probability of using the practice
at all. Results for the control variables with the Arrears (dummy) as dependent variable, shown
in the table, are generally similar to those in Table 3.
***INSERT TABLE 4 HERE***
To assess the robustness of the estimated effects of Local Arrears with respect to
alternative measures of growth and liquidity, we substitute such alternative variables for the sales
and wage growth. As an example, Table 5 reports the analogous results for the firm fixed effect
specification from Table 3 using Local Arrears (months). We consider these alternative
measures separately because they are highly correlated with one another. Most of these variables
are statistically significant, but some of them only weakly so. Regardless of the specification,
however, the effect of lagged local wage arrears remains large and highly statistically significant.
The magnitude ranges from around .35 to .45, depending on the exact specification.6 In general,
the results for the variable of interest are highly robust to changes in the statistical specification.
Not only is the estimated impact of lagged Local Arrears positive, sizable in magnitude,
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and precisely estimated (statistically significant), it also accounts for a substantial proportion of
the variation in firm-level Arrears. The R2s in Tables 3-5 range from 0.21 to 0.33. Moreover,
when we drop all control variables, the local arrears by itself has large explanatory power. For
instance, with Arrears (months) as dependent variable and only Local Arrears (months) as an
independent variable, the R2 is 0.18. These results provide strong support for Hypothesis 1 that
firm behavior is strongly affected by the behavior of other local organizations, and wage arrears
become normalized through interactions in local communities.
***INSERT TABLE 5 HERE***
Worker Responses to Wage Arrears
Our final results concern the mechanisms through which community normalization
processes may take place: worker responses through voice (strikes and protests) and exit (quits).
Table 6 presents the findings from this analysis. Consistent with hypotheses 2 and 3, the results
show that worker responses to arrears are strongly affected by the extent of arrears in their local
environment. The results imply that workers do respond to larger arrears at their firms with
higher strike probability and quit rates – but only at low levels of arrears in the local community.
An additional 3 months of Arrears is estimated to raise the probability of a strike by 5 percent
and the quit rate by 3-4 percent, when Local Arrears (months) or Local Arrears (share) is close
to zero. As either measure of Local Arrears rises, however, the coefficient on the interaction
effect shows that the worker responsiveness to Arrears declines rapidly. At higher levels of
Local Arrears, (such as those in the late 1990s), workers hardly respond at all to increases in
arrears at their own firms, apparently becoming passive – at least in terms of this observable
behavior – in the face of larger arrears.

6

We estimated many versions of these equations, all of them producing similar findings to those in Table 5. Among
other specifications, we included all of our growth and liquidity measures in a single “kitchen sink” regression, and
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***INSERT TABLE 6 HERE***
These results are again robust to a wide variety of changes in the statistical specification
of the estimating equations. Among a number of alternatives, we investigated whether the extent
to which community norms moderate worker responses is a function of union status and firm
size. On the one hand, unions might serve to overcome the moderation of individual behavior by
providing a broader view on the possibilities for resisting the wage arrears practice. On the other
hand, larger firms might be more likely to use the practice because they are larger players in the
local community, helping to set local norms. In neither case, however, did we find any
detectable pattern of increase or decrease in the moderation effect, which on the contrary appears
to be uniform over these different types of firms. Overall, our findings strongly support the
normalization hypotheses that the level of arrears in the community attenuates the exit and voice
responses of workers to their own arrears.
DISCUSSION
In developing our hypotheses, we proposed that normalization processes were likely to
facilitate organizational use of a deviant organizational practice as well as curtail stakeholder
opposition to it. Our analysis of the growth of wage arrears in Russia supports both these
propositions. We first found that the lagged level of local arrears is a strong predictor of firmlevel arrears. This effect is large and robust even when controlling for a host of firm
characteristics, including alternative measures of growth, performance, liquidity, and other
relevant covariates. The analysis also includes firm fixed effects to control for any unobserved
propensity for firms to use arrears that may be correlated with lagged local arrears.

the estimated local wage arrears effect remained large and highly significant.
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Our findings also demonstrate that there is less, rather than more, opposition to wage
arrears in the communities where they are the most prevalent. In communities with low arrears, a
firm‟s quit rate and strike probability both tend to increase with the level of firm arrears. In areas
with high arrears, however, these responses are strongly attenuated. Workers are less likely to
oppose wage arrears in localities in which the practice is more widely used. Workers are not
simply responding to their immediate experience of wage arrears in their own firms but are
clearly influenced by the broader community context in which they find themselves.
The study of the normalization of deviant organizational practices like wage arrears raises
important questions for the study of how communities confer and communicate legitimacy in
organizational systems. Existing empirical research emphasizes the role of managers in creating
their own norms of acceptable organizational behavior. Community-wide processes influence the
spread of organizational practices because managers observe and respond to one another as they
face everyday strategic issues (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). However,
others argue that a focus on managerial cognition and consensus underemphasizes the way in
which coercion and conflict shape social norms (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997; Mizruchi and Fein,
1999). What is legitimate for managers may not be legitimate for other social actors (Perrow,
1986). Therefore, an examination of the role of managers in constructing their own definitions of
legitimate behavior requires the question: legitimate for whom? These authors argue that
audiences and interests beyond those of managers need to be analyzed to understand the way that
communities construct and confer legitimacy in organizational systems (see also Clemens and
Cook, 1999; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; Fligstein, 1990; Stryker, 2000).
The issue of whose conception of legitimacy is operable at any particular time or place
represents the central question in the study of normalization processes and outcomes. The
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institutionalization of an organizational practice does not necessarily need to be accompanied by
its legitimization. As the extensive literature on normalization demonstrates, deviant
organizational practices may become embedded in institutional structure and processes even
through they violate external laws and norms. Institutional norms are important not only because
they identify the range of practices that managers consider to be acceptable, but also because
they frame the set of practices that other groups of actors come to accept without active
mobilization. Further research into the influence of normalization processes on the behavior of
organizational actors other than managers represents an important avenue for future study.
A limitation of this study is that we are unable to observe the historical processes that led
some Russian communities to normalize deviance and others to challenge it. Our study only
looks at the consequences of the cumulative adoption of wage arrears at a single point of time
without an examination of the full set of social dynamics that allowed for differential paths of
development among Russian communities. Nor are we able to directly tap into the individual
process of decision-making that shaped the aggregate responses we found in our data. The
limitations of our research design are similar to those found in organizational research that uses
cumulative adoption of an organizational practice as a proxy for the presence of an institutional
norm. These studies similarly infer decision-making processes by looking at aggregate patterns
of behavior (Fligstein, 1985; Guler, Guillen, and Macpherson, 2002; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou,
1993; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell, 1997).
Despite these limitations, we suggest that our empirical design provides an important
contribution to the study of the institutional foundations of organizational deviance. While there
is a growing theoretical literature developing about normalization processes (Ashforth & Anand,
2003; Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, J.M. 2001; Ermann & Lundman, 2002; Pinto, Leana & Pil,
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2008; Palmer, 2008; Vaughan, 1999), there are inherent difficulties in testing these models
empirically. One of the largest challenges is that records are usually not kept about behavior that
violates the law, making it difficult to systematically examine normalization processes in actual
business settings. If data are available, they usually come from judicial hearings and
investigations (Baucus, and Near, 1991; Simpson, 1986). Yet, in some cases of systemic
deviance, it is precisely the absence of meaningful regulation that contributes to its persistence.
Relying on formal hearings and prosecutions to collect data makes it difficult to pick up some
type of systemic deviance, especially in contexts outside the United States.
We were able to develop an empirical test of normalization processes because wage
arrears were sufficiently normalized in Russia that they were openly reported despite their
violation of formal law. Collecting reliable data about such deviant organizational practices as
child labor, employee discrimination, sweatshops or human right abuses may be more difficult to
accomplish. Despite these challenges, we suggest that the normalization model tested in this
paper could be productively applied in future research to better understand the growth and
persistence of many forms of deviant organizational behavior.

32

REFERENCES
Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. 2003. The cross-national diversity of corporate governance:
Dimensions and determinants. Academy of Management Review, 28: 447-465.
Alfandari, G., & Schaffer, M. E. 1996. „Arrears‟ in the Russian enterprise sector. In S. Commander, Q.
Fan, and M. E. Schaffer (Eds.), Enterprise Restructuring and Economic Policy in Russia: 87-139.
Washington: The World Bank.
Ashforth, B. E., & Anand, V. 2003. The normalization of corruption in organizations. In R. M. Kramer
& B. M. Staw (eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior, 25: 1-52.
Barley, S. R., & Tolbert, P. S. 1997. Institutionalization and structuration: Studying the links between
action and institutions. Organization Studies. 18: 93-117.
Baucus, M. S. & Near, J. P. 1991. Can illegal corporate behavior be predicted? An event history
analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 34: 9-36.
Berger, P. & Luckman, T. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of
Knowledge. New York: Anchor Books.
Biletsky, S., Brown, J., Earle, J., Khaleeva, J., Komarov, I., Lazareva, O., & Sabirianova, K. 2003.
Inside the Transforming Firm. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Brief, A. P., Buttram, R. T., & Dukerich, J. M. 2001. Collective corruption in the corporate world:
Toward a process model. In M. E. Turner (ed.), Groups at Work: Advances in Theory and
Research: 471-499. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Burns, L. R., & Wholey, D. R. 1993. Adoption and abandonment of matrix management programs:
Effects of organizational characteristics and interorganizational networks. Academy of
Management Journal, 36:106-138.
Clemens, E. S., & Cook, J. M. 1999. Politics and institutionalism: Explaining durability and change.
Annual Review of Sociology, 25: 441-466.
Davis, G. F. 1991. Agents without principles? The spread of the poison pill through the intercorporate
33

network. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36: 583-613.
Desai, P., & T. Idson. 2000. Work without Wages: Russia’s Nonpayment Crisis. Cambridge: MIT
Press.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective
rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48: 147-160.
Earle, J., & Sabirianova, K. 2000. Equilibrium wage arrears: A theoretical and empirical analysis of
institutional lock-In.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 196 September.
Earle, J., & Sabirianova, K. 2002. How late to pay? Understanding wage arrears in Russia. Journal of
Labor Economics, 20: 661-707.
Edwards, R. 1979. Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth
Century. New York: Basic Books.
Emirbayer, M., & Mische, A. 1998. What is agency? American Journal of Sociology, 103: 962-1023
Ermann, M. D., & Lundman, R. J. 2002. Corporate and government deviance: Origins, patterns, and
actions. In M. D. Ermann & R. J. Lundman (eds.), Corporate and Governmental Deviance:
Problems of Organizational Behavior in Contemporary Society, 3-49. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Fligstein, N. 1985. The spread of the multidivisional form among large firms, 1919-1979. American
Sociological Review, 50:377-391.
Fligstein, N. 1990. The Transformation of Corporate Control. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Geis, G. 1977. The heavy electrical equipment antitrust cases of 1961. In G. Geis, & R. F. Meier (Eds.),
White Collar Crime: Offenses in Business, Politics, and the Professions: 117-132. New York:
Free Press.
Gerber, T. P. 2006. “Getting paid: Wage arrears and stratification in Russia. American Journal of
Sociology, 111: 1816-1870.
Gimpelson, V. 1998. The politics of labour market adjustment: The case of russia. Collegium Budapest
34

Discussion Paper No. 54.
Gimpelson, V., & Lippoldt, D. 2001. The Russian Labor Market: Between Transition and Turmoil,
Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.
Gioia, D. A., & Thomas, J. B. 1996. Identity, image, and issue interpretation: Sensemaking during
strategic change in academia. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41: 370-403.
Goskomstat. 1998. Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskoe Polozhenie Rossii 1997. Moscow: Goskomstat of
Russia.
Guler, I., Guillen M., & Macpherson, J. M. 2002. Global competition, institutions, and the diffusion of
organizational practices: The international spread of ISO 9000 quality certificates. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 47:207-232.
Hinings, C. R., & Greenwood, R. 2002. Disconnects and consequences in organization theory?
Administrative Science Quarterly, 47: 411-421.
Hirsch, P. M. & Lounsbury, M. 1997. Ending the family quarrel: Toward a reconciliation of "old" and
“new" institutionalisms. American Behavioural Scientist, 40: 406-418.
Hirschman, A. O. 1970. Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations and
States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Javeline, D. 2003. Protest and the Politics of Blame: The Russian Response to Unpaid Wages. Ann
Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
Jepperson, R. 1991. Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalism. In W. Powell& P. DiMaggio
(Eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis: 143-163. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Kapeliushnikov, R. 2001. The Russian Labor Market: Adjustment without Restructuring. Moscow:
State University, Higher School of Economics.
Layard, R., & Richter, A. 1994. Labour market adjustment–the Russian way. Mimeo, June 8.
Layard, R., & Richter, A. 1995. How much unemployment is needed for restructuring: The Russian
35

experience. Economics of Transition, 3: 35-58.
Lehmann, H., Wadsworth, J., & Acquisti, A. 1999. Grime and punishment: Job insecurity and wage
arrears in the Russian Federation. Journal of Comparative Economics. 27: 595-617.
Louis, M. R. 1980. Surprise and sense making: What newcomers experience in entering unfamiliar
organizational settings. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25: 226-251.
March, J., & Olsen, J. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New
York: Free Press.
Margolis, J., & Walsh, J. 2003 Misery loves companies: Rethinking social initiatives by business.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 48: 268-305.
Marsden, P. V., Kalleberg, A. L., & Knoke, D. 2000. Surveying organizational structures and human
resource practices: The national organizations study. In R. T. Golembiewski (ed.), Handbook of
Organizational Behavior (Second Edition). New York: Marcel Dekker: 175-201.
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and
ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83: 340-363.
Misangyi, V. F., Weaver, G. R., & Elm, H. 2008. Ending corruption: The interplay among institutional
logics, resources, and institutional entrepreneurs. Academy of Management Review, 33: 750-770.
Mitchneck, B., & Plane, D. 1995. Migration and the quasi-labor market in Russia. International
Regional Science Review, 18: 267-288.
Mizruchi, M. S. & Fein, L. C. 1999. The social construction of organizational knowledge: A study of
the uses of coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44:
653-683.
OECD. 2000. OECD Economic Surveys: The Russian Federation. Paris: OECD.
Palmer, D. A., Jennings, P. D., & Zhou, X. 1993. Late adoption of the multidivisional form by large
U.S. corporations: Institutional, political, and economic accounts. Administrative Science Quarterly
38: 100-131.
36

Palmer, D. 2008. Extending the process model of collective corruption. Research in Organization
Behavior. Forthcoming.
Perrow, C. 1986. Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay. Glencoe, IL: Scott Foresman.
Pinto, J., Leana, C., & Pil, F. 2008. Corrupt organizations or organizations of corrupt individuals? Two
types of organization-level corruption. Academy of Management Review, Forthcoming.
Piven, F. F., & Cloward, R. A. 1978. Poor People’s Movements. New York: Vintage Books.
Powell, W., & DiMaggio, P. 1991. Introduction. In W. W. Powell, & P. DiMaggio (Eds.), The New
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis: 1-40. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Radin, T. & Calkins, M. 2006. The struggle against sweatshops: Moving toward responsible global
business. Journal of Business Ethics, 66: 261-272.
Roe, Mark. 2006. Political Determinants of Corporate Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rosen, E. I. 2002 Making Sweatshops: The Globalization of the US Apparel Industry. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Seo, M. G., & Creed, W. E. D. 2002. Institutional contradictions, praxis, and institutional change: A
dialectical perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 27: 222-247.
Simpson, S. S. 1986. The decomposition of antitrust: Testing a multi-level, longitudinal model of
profit-squeeze. American Sociological Review, 51: 859-875.
Stryker, R. 2000. Legitimacy processes as institutional politics: Implications for theory and research in
the sociology of organizations. Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 17: 179-223.
Swafford, M. 1997. Sample of the Russian Federation Rounds V, VI, and VII of the Russian
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. Technical report.
Tenbrunsel, A. E. & Messick, D. M. 2004. Ethical fading: The role of self-deception in unethical
behavior. Social Justice Research, 17: 223-236.
Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. 1983. Institutional sources of change in the formal structure of
organizations: The diffusion of civil service reform, 1880-1935. Administrative Science Quarterly,
37

28: 22-39.
Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. 1996. The institutionalization of institutional theory. In S. Clegg, C.
Hardy, and W. R. Nord (Eds.), Handbook of Organization Studies: 175-190. London: Sage.
Vaughan, D. 1996. The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at
NASA. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Vaughan, D. 1999. The dark side of organizations: Mistake, misconduct and disaster. Annual Review of
Sociology, 25: 271-305.
Westphal, J. D., Gulati, R. & Shortell, S. M. 1997. Customization or conformity? An institutional and
network perspective on the content and consequences of TQM adoption. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 42: 366-394.
Zey, M. 1993. Banking on fraud: Drexel, junk bonds, and buyouts. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Zey, M. 1998. Embeddedness of interorganizational corporate crime in the 1980s: Securities fraud of
banks and investment banks. In S. B. Bacharach, P. A. Bamberger, & W. J. Sonnenstuhl (Eds.),
Research in the Sociology of Organizations, Volume 15: 111-159. Stamford, CT: JAI Press Inc.
Zucker, L. G. 1977. The Role of institutionalization in cultural persistence. American Sociological
Review 42:726-743.

38

Table 1
Incidence and Magnitude of Wage Arrears in the Firm Sample, 1991-1998
1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Mean Arrears(dummy)

0.075

0.098

0.132

0.221

0.375

0.483

0.597

0.586

Mean Arrears(months)

0.147

0.255

0.334

0.644

1.143

1.725

2.363

2.501

Frequency distribution Arrears(months)
0
1 month
2-3 months
4-6 months
>6 months

0.925
0.037
0.028
0.006
0.004

0.904
0.035
0.041
0.014
0.006

0.870
0.041
0.060
0.021
0.008

0.780
0.064
0.106
0.037
0.014

0.625
0.075
0.208
0.063
0.029

0.517
0.064
0.234
0.146
0.039

0.403
0.081
0.277
0.145
0.094

0.414
0.080
0.246
0.150
0.109

Mean Arrears(months)|Arrears(months)>0

1.974

2.661

2.575

2.921

3.051

3.571

3.960

4.269

509

512

516

517

523

534

553

560

N (sample size)

Notes: Sample consists of agricultural and industrial firms responding to wage arrears question.
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Table 2
Summary Statistics, 1998
Variable Name
Industry (N=560)
Energy / Fuel
Metallurgy / Chemicals
Machine Building
Building Materials / Wood
Light
Food
Other manufacturing
Agriculture
Location (N=560)
Moscow or St. Petersburg
Regional Capital City
Other City
Non-City
Union Density (N=541)
0-9%
10-59%
60-79%
80-89%
90-99%
100%
Fringe benefits provided by firm
Training (dummy, N=554)
Kindergarten (dummy, N=555)
Housing (dummy, N=550)

N

Mean

Firm size (log of employment)

521

5.971

Standard
Deviation
1.653

Growth measures, G
Hiring rate (ratio to average employment)
One-year growth in sales
One-year growth in output
One-year growth in real wages
One-year growth in nominal wages
One-year growth in employment
Received patents (dummy)

412
410
454
424
424
467
474

0.209
-0.238
-0.248
-0.162
0.063
-0.094
0.152

0.258
0.502
0.440
0.327
0.317
0.216
0.359

Liquidity measures, L
Profitability (profit/output)
Positive profit (dummy)
Frozen bank account (dummy)
Barter in payments for inputs (dummy)
Barter in sales (dummy)
Overdue receivables (dummy)
Overdue payables (dummy)

452
454
545
451
479
423
422

-0.192
0.557
0.640
0.772
0.791
0.752
0.758

1.039
0.497
0.480
0.420
0.407
0.432
0.429

560
417

0.055
0.198

0.229
0.209

Mean
0.080
0.077
0.313
0.105
0.084
0.132
0.075
0.134
0.113
0.352
0.327
0.209
0.196
0.104
0.091
0.092
0.237
0.281
0.561
0.268
0.245

Variable Name

Worker responses
Occurrence of strikes, S (dummy)
Quit rate, Q (ratio of quits to
average employment)
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Table 3
Wage Arrears Function Estimates
Dependent variable – Arrears (months)
OLS
FE
OLS
Local Arrears (months)
0.525***
0.414***
…
(0.096)
(0.124)
Local Arrears (share)
…
…
3.634***
(0.495)
G: Sales growth
-0.310***
-0.012
-0.288**
(0.117)
(0.081)
(0.113)
L: Nominal wage growth
-0.434*
-0.611***
-0.522**
(0.235)
(0.194)
(0.248)
Log of firm employment
0.166***
-1.095***
0.155***
(0.044)
(0.372)
(0.044)
Union density (100% is omitted)
0-9%
-0.506
0.833
-0.409
(0.309)
(0.683)
(0.311)
10-59%
0.433**
1.014*
0.474**
(0.218)
(0.579)
(0.216)
60-78%
0.072
0.971*
0.082
(0.224)
(0.503)
(0.219)
80-89%
0.140
0.765
0.176
(0.275)
(0.496)
(0.268)
90-100%
0.059
0.637*
0.121
(0.137)
(0.329)
(0.136)
Fringe benefits provided by firms (dummies)
Training
-0.735***
-0.814
-0.699***
(0.148)
(0.549)
(0.148)
Kindergartens
-0.131
-0.062
-0.162
(0.148)
(0.353)
(0.147)
Housing purchase and
-0.364***
-0.069
-0.306**
Construction
(0.135)
(0.331)
(0.135)
Federal districts (Central is omitted)
North West
0.060
0.031
(0.283)
(0.292)
South
0.050
0.001
(0.188)
(0.183)
Volga
-0.039
-0.287*
(0.173)
(0.174)
Urals
-0.032
-0.486**
(0.207)
(0.212)
Siberia
0.639**
0.176
(0.294)
(0.313)
Far East
0.161
-0.405
(0.414)
(0.410)
Type of location (Moscow and St. Petersburg are omitted)
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FE
…
2.393***
(0.652)
0.003
(0.081)
-0.633***
(0.193)
-0.942***
(0.360)
0.941
(0.685)
1.001*
(0.572)
0.931*
(0.498)
0.720
(0.481)
0.574*
(0.317)
-0.745
(0.543)
-0.107
(0.347)
-0.021
(0.326)

Regional capital city
Other city
Non-city
Industry (Energy/Fuel is omitted)
Metallurgy/Chemicals
Machine building
Building materials/Wood
Processing
Light
Food
Other manufacturing
Agriculture
N
R2

-0.150
(0.308)
-0.355
(0.287)
-0.330
(0.360)

-0.315
(0.321)
-0.580**
(0.293)
-0.493
(0.361)

-0.616***
(0.225)
0.302
(0.199)
-0.086
(0.251)
-0.793***
(0.211)
-1.211***
(0.205)
-0.714***
(0.238)
2.134***
(0.396)
1532
0.31

-0.597***
(0.220)
0.243
(0.193)
-0.139
(0.240)
-0.802***
(0.205)
-1.085***
(0.201)
-0.753***
(0.226)
2.082***
(0.376)
1570
0.32

1532
0.22

1570
0.22

Notes: FE=firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5%
level; *significant at 10% level. Year dummies and intercept are included but not shown here. R 2 = R2-within for FE
estimates.
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Table 4
Wage Arrears Function Estimates
Dependent variable – Arrears (dummy)
OLS
FE
OLS
Local Arrears (months)
0.062***
0.069***
…
(0.012)
(0.020)
Local Arrears (share)
…
…
0.757***
(0.074)
G: Sales growth
-0.038*
-0.001
-0.030
(0.022)
(0.017)
(0.021)
L: Nominal wage growth
-0.057
-0.044
-0.070*
(0.045)
(0.040)
(0.042)
Log of firm employment
0.050***
-0.170***
0.047***
(0.010)
(0.058)
(0.009)
Union density (100% is omitted)
0-9%
-0.138**
0.187
-0.115**
(0.054)
(0.133)
(0.052)
10-59%
0.111***
0.181
0.118***
(0.041)
(0.120)
(0.039)
60-78%
0.011
0.140
0.023
(0.046)
(0.096)
(0.045)
80-89%
-0.019
0.062
-0.008
(0.042)
(0.089)
(0.040)
90-100%
0.003
0.089
0.021
(0.029)
(0.073)
(0.028)
Fringe benefits provided by firms (dummies)
Training
-0.128***
-0.131*
-0.108***
(0.026)
(0.077)
(0.026)
Kindergartens
-0.005
0.011
-0.014
(0.027)
(0.059)
(0.026)
Housing purchase and
-0.039
-0.015
-0.026
Construction
(0.025)
(0.061)
(0.024)
Federal districts (Central is omitted)
North West
0.080*
0.045
(0.048)
(0.047)
South
0.089**
0.077**
(0.037)
(0.037)
Volga
0.113***
0.042
(0.032)
(0.033)
Urals
0.128***
0.024
(0.043)
(0.044)
Siberia
0.269***
0.136***
(0.045)
(0.046)
Far East
0.186***
0.038
(0.068)
(0.068)
Type of location (Moscow and St. Petersburg are omitted)
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FE
…
0.435***
(0.123)
-0.002
(0.017)
-0.046
(0.037)
-0.147***
(0.056)
0.192
(0.133)
0.168
(0.120)
0.122
(0.096)
0.050
(0.088)
0.081
(0.071)
-0.120
(0.077)
0.002
(0.058)
-0.005
(0.060)

Regional capital city
Other city
Non-city
Industry (Energy/Fuel is omitted)
Metallurgy/Chemicals
Machine building
Building materials/Wood
Processing
Light
Food
Other manufacturing
Agriculture
N
R2

0.064
(0.052)
0.098*
(0.052)
0.182***
(0.066)

0.012
(0.051)
0.048
(0.051)
0.121*
(0.064)

-0.115**
(0.051)
0.104**
(0.041)
0.057
(0.051)
-0.031
(0.051)
-0.245***
(0.046)
-0.119**
(0.057)
0.080
(0.065)
1532
0.30

-0.126***
(0.049)
0.093**
(0.040)
0.055
(0.049)
-0.034
(0.050)
-0.224***
(0.044)
-0.130**
(0.055)
0.057
(0.059)
1570
0.33

1532
0.26

1570
0.26

Notes: FE=firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5%
level; *significant at 10% level. Year dummies and intercept are included but not shown here. R2 = R2-within for FE
estimates.
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Table 5
Alternative Specifications of Growth and Liquidity Measures
In Wage Arrears Functions
Independent variables
Local Arrears (months)
Git: Output growth
Lit: Frozen bank account (dummy)
Git: One-year change in
Employment

1
0.397***
(0.096)
-0.107
(0.065)
0.789***
(0.127)
…

Model Specifications
2
3
0.451***
0.367***
(0.117)
(0.103)
…
…

4
0.347***
(0.093)
…

…

…

…

0.147
(0.344)

…

…
…

Lit: Positive profit (dummy)

…

-0.671***
(0.191)

…

Git: Rate of hiring

…

…

…

-0.688**
(0.306)

Lit: Profitability (profit/output)

…

…

…

-0.303**
(0.121)

Git: Received patents (dummy)

…

…

-0.951*
(0.572)

…

Lit: Real wage growth

…

-0.238**
(0.107)

…

1771
0.28

2013
0.21

Observations
R2-within

2433
0.23

2130
0.26

Notes: Dependent variable = Arrears (months). Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level;
** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. All four specifications use firm fixed effects, the same set of
control variables as in Table 3, plus the additional growth and liquidity measures shown.
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Table 6
Worker Responses to Firm and Local Arrears
Arrears (months)
Local Arrears (months)
Arrears x Local Arrears
(months)
Local Arrears (share)
Arrears x Local Arrears
(share)

Strike Incidence (OLS)
1
2
0.016*** 0.013**
(0.004)
(0.006)
0.000
…
(0.004)
-0.003***
…

Quit Rate (OLS)
1
2
0.010*** 0.015***
(0.003)
(0.004)
0.003
…
(0.005)
-0.002**
…

Quit Rate (Firm FE)
1
2
0.004
0.009**
(0.003)
(0.004)
0.016***
…
(0.006)
-0.001*
…

(0.001)
…

(0.001)
…

(0.001)
…

…

0.011
(0.023)
-0.005

…

(0.010)
0.009*** 0.009*** -0.012***
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.003)
Union density (100% is omitted)
0-9%
0.013
0.014
0.031
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.025)
10-59%
0.006
0.008
0.026**
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.012)
60-78%
0.026**
0.027**
-0.003
(0.011)
(0.012)
(0.012)
80-89%
0.017
0.017
0.016
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
90-100%
-0.001
0.000
0.013*
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.007)
Fringe benefits provided by firms (dummies)
Training
0.013**
0.013**
-0.018**
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.008)
Kindergartens
-0.007
-0.008
0.001
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.007)
Housing purchase and
0.012
0.012
-0.045
construction/10
(0.056)
(0.056)
(0.067)
Type of location (Moscow and St. Petersburg are omitted)
Regional capital city
0.016
0.015
0.011
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.012)
Other city
0.005
0.004
0.020
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.012)
Non-city
0.000
-0.003
-0.029
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.018)
Observations
3129
3129
2251
2
R
0.07
0.07
0.14
Log of firm employment

0.054**
(0.024)
-0.019***

…

0.084***
(0.031)
-0.014**

(0.006)
-0.012***
(0.003)

-0.045**
(0.017)

(0.006)
-0.042**
(0.017)

0.031
(0.025)
0.025**
(0.012)
-0.004
(0.012)
0.015
(0.012)
0.013*
(0.007)

-0.017
(0.037)
0.014
(0.025)
-0.008
(0.021)
0.017
(0.019)
0.007
(0.013)

-0.019
(0.037)
0.010
(0.025)
-0.012
(0.021)
0.015
(0.019)
0.004
(0.013)

-0.017**
(0.008)
0.001
(0.007)
-0.042
(0.067)

-0.004
(0.020)
-0.006
(0.013)
-0.113
(0.097)

-0.003
(0.020)
-0.006
(0.013)
-0.108
(0.098)

0.004
(0.012)
0.015
(0.012)
-0.035*
(0.018)
2251
0.14

2251
0.04

2251
0.04

Notes: Strike incidence=dummy for strike or protest. Quit rate=ratio of quits to average employment. Robust standard
errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. Year and industry
dummies and intercept are included but not shown here. R2 = R2-within for FE estimates.
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